Architects and security engineers use this prompt to move from narrative architecture descriptions and compliance documents to a structured, testable list of security non-functional requirements (NFRs). The core job-to-be-done is extracting measurable acceptance criteria—such as 'session tokens must be invalidated server-side within 60 seconds of logout'—and linking each requirement to a specific control from a standard like NIST SP 800-53, OWASP ASVS, or an internal threat model. This prompt is designed for the design review phase, after threat modeling has identified risks and before implementation planning begins. The ideal user has a design document, a compliance standard, and a threat model in hand, and needs to produce a prioritized NFR register that QA and platform engineering can test against.
Prompt
Security Non-Functional Requirements Extraction Prompt

When to Use This Prompt
Understand the job-to-be-done, the required inputs, and the boundaries where this prompt adds value versus where it breaks down.
This prompt requires structured input to produce reliable output. You must supply a [DESIGN_DOCUMENT] containing the system's architecture, data flows, and trust boundaries, a [COMPLIANCE_STANDARD] or control framework to map against, and a [THREAT_MODEL] that identifies specific threats and their severities. The prompt uses these to generate a table of NFRs, each with a unique ID, a measurable criterion, a priority derived from threat severity, and a traceable control reference. Do not use this prompt when you lack a threat model or design document—without them, the model will invent plausible but untethered requirements that fail audit. Do not use it for real-time operational security decisions or incident response; it is a design-time tool, not a runtime guardrail. For high-risk regulated environments, always require a human security architect to review and approve the output before it enters a requirements management system.
The output is a structured NFR list, not a final security policy. Treat it as a draft that accelerates the requirements engineering process. After generation, validate that every NFR is testable—if you cannot write a test case for an acceptance criterion, the requirement is too vague. Wire the output into your requirements traceability matrix and link each NFR back to the originating threat and control. Common failure modes include the model generating requirements for threats not present in your model, omitting data residency constraints, or producing criteria that are not measurable. The next step is to run the output through the evaluation harness described in the testing section of this playbook, checking for coverage gaps, duplicate requirements, and untestable criteria before handing off to the implementation team.
Use Case Fit
Where this prompt works, where it fails, and what you must provide before running it.
Good Fit: Structured Design Docs
Use when: You have a written system design, architecture decision record, or threat model document. The prompt extracts measurable security NFRs from explicit statements about authentication, encryption, or access control. Guardrail: Provide the document as [DESIGN_DOCUMENT] and a relevant [COMPLIANCE_STANDARD] to ground extraction in specific controls.
Bad Fit: Implicit or Undocumented Systems
Avoid when: The system exists only in conversation or tribal knowledge. The prompt cannot interview engineers or observe running systems. Guardrail: Require a written artifact as input. If none exists, use a design-documentation prompt first, then run NFR extraction on the result.
Required Input: Control Catalog
Risk: Without a reference standard, the model invents plausible-sounding but non-auditable requirements. Guardrail: Always supply a [COMPLIANCE_STANDARD] or [CONTROL_FRAMEWORK] (e.g., NIST 800-53, SOC 2, OWASP ASVS). The harness should reject outputs that lack control-to-requirement traceability.
Required Input: Threat Model Context
Risk: NFRs extracted without threat context miss adversary-specific requirements like credential theft resistance or lateral movement prevention. Guardrail: Supply a [THREAT_MODEL] or [ATTACK_SURFACE] description. The eval suite should flag NFRs that address no identified threat.
Operational Risk: Vague Acceptance Criteria
Risk: The model produces NFRs like 'the system must be secure' that cannot be tested or verified. Guardrail: Require each NFR to include a [MEASURABLE_CRITERION] (e.g., 'all authentication attempts must be logged within 100ms'). The harness validator should reject requirements without quantifiable thresholds.
Operational Risk: Priority Inflation
Risk: Every extracted NFR is marked 'critical,' making the list useless for engineering planning. Guardrail: Require a [PRIORITY_SCHEMA] (e.g., 'must-have vs. should-have vs. nice-to-have') and a [BLAST_RADIUS] assessment. The eval should check that at least 30% of NFRs are not top-priority.
Copy-Ready Prompt Template
A copy-ready prompt template for extracting testable security NFRs from design documents, compliance references, and threat model outputs.
The prompt below instructs the model to extract, prioritize, and structure security non-functional requirements from your provided inputs. It enforces a strict output schema, requires measurable acceptance criteria for every NFR, and demands traceability from each requirement back to a specific control, threat, or compliance reference. Copy the template, replace the square-bracket placeholders with your actual documents, and run it against a capable model.
textYou are a security architect extracting testable non-functional requirements (NFRs) from design documents, compliance standards, and threat models. ## INPUTS - Design Documents: [DESIGN_DOCUMENTS] - Compliance References: [COMPLIANCE_REFERENCES] - Threat Model Output: [THREAT_MODEL_OUTPUT] - Risk Appetite: [RISK_APPETITE] ## TASK 1. Extract every security-related NFR implied or stated in the inputs. 2. For each NFR, derive one or more measurable acceptance criteria that would allow a reviewer to verify whether the requirement is met. 3. Map each NFR to the specific control, threat, or compliance clause that justifies it. If no direct source exists, mark the traceability as "Derived from architectural best practice" and explain the reasoning. 4. Assign a priority (Critical, High, Medium, Low) based on the risk appetite and the severity of the threat or compliance gap the NFR addresses. 5. Identify any conflicting NFRs and note the conflict with a recommended resolution. ## OUTPUT SCHEMA Return a valid JSON object with this exact structure: { "project": "string", "risk_appetite": "string", "extraction_timestamp": "string (ISO 8601)", "non_functional_requirements": [ { "nfr_id": "string (e.g., SEC-NFR-001)", "category": "string (e.g., Authentication, Authorization, Data Protection, Audit, Resilience, Network Segmentation)", "requirement": "string (the NFR statement)", "priority": "Critical | High | Medium | Low", "acceptance_criteria": ["string (measurable criterion)"], "traceability": [ { "source_type": "design_document | compliance_reference | threat_model | derived", "source_id": "string (document section, control ID, threat ID, or 'derived')", "rationale": "string (why this source justifies the NFR)" } ], "conflicts": [ { "conflicting_nfr_id": "string", "description": "string", "recommended_resolution": "string" } ] } ], "unresolved_gaps": ["string (areas where the inputs lacked sufficient detail to define NFRs)"] } ## CONSTRAINTS - Every NFR must have at least one measurable acceptance criterion. Do not use vague terms like "secure" or "robust" without a specific measurement. - Every NFR must have at least one traceability entry. - If the inputs contain no information about a security domain (e.g., no mention of audit logging), add an entry to `unresolved_gaps` rather than inventing requirements. - Do not include functional requirements, user stories, or implementation details. Focus strictly on non-functional security properties. - If the risk appetite is "Low" or "Conservative", raise the priority of data protection and audit NFRs by one level.
After copying the template, replace each placeholder with the actual content from your architecture review. For [DESIGN_DOCUMENTS], paste the relevant sections of your system design, API specs, and data flow diagrams. For [COMPLIANCE_REFERENCES], include the specific control IDs and text from SOC 2, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, HIPAA, or your internal policy documents. For [THREAT_MODEL_OUTPUT], paste the structured output from your STRIDE or attack-tree analysis. The [RISK_APPETITE] placeholder should be set to one of "Aggressive", "Moderate", "Conservative", or "Low" to calibrate the priority assignment logic. If you lack a formal threat model, you can substitute a summary of known threats and attack surfaces, but the traceability quality will degrade. Run the prompt, validate the JSON output against the schema, and feed any unresolved_gaps back into your architecture review process before finalizing the NFR list.
Prompt Variables
Each placeholder must be populated for the prompt to produce reliable, traceable output. Use this table to prepare inputs before invoking the Security NFR Extraction Prompt.
| Placeholder | Purpose | Example | Validation Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
[DESIGN_DOCUMENT] | The full text of the architecture design document, system diagram description, or technical specification to analyze for security NFRs. | A markdown document describing a new microservice with API gateway, database, and third-party integrations. Includes data flow notes and deployment topology. | Required. Must be non-empty. Check for minimum 200 words to ensure sufficient context. If null or truncated, abort extraction and request complete document. |
[COMPLIANCE_STANDARDS] | A list of applicable regulatory frameworks, standards, or internal policies that the extracted NFRs must satisfy. | SOC 2 Type II, GDPR Article 32, PCI DSS 4.0, internal InfoSec Policy v3.2 | Required. Accepts comma-separated list or null if no external standards apply. If null, prompt should default to general security best practices. Validate each entry against a known standards registry if available. |
[THREAT_MODEL_OUTPUT] | Optional output from a prior threat modeling exercise (STRIDE, attack trees) to cross-reference against extracted NFRs for coverage gaps. | A JSON array of threat objects with id, description, affected-component, and severity fields from a prior STRIDE analysis. | Optional. Accepts null. If provided, validate that the structure contains threat descriptions and affected components. If malformed, log warning and proceed without threat model cross-reference. |
[SYSTEM_BOUNDARY_CONTEXT] | A description of what is in-scope and out-of-scope for this security review, including trust boundaries and external interfaces. | In-scope: Order Service, Payment Gateway integration, Customer DB. Out-of-scope: Third-party fraud detection service (reviewed separately). Trust boundary at API Gateway. | Required. Must be non-empty. Check for explicit in-scope and out-of-scope statements. If missing, prompt should request clarification before generating NFRs to avoid scope creep. |
[DATA_CLASSIFICATION_MAP] | A mapping of data types flowing through the system to their classification levels, used to derive appropriate protection requirements. | PII (customer name, email): Confidential. Payment tokens: Restricted. Order history: Internal. Public catalog: Public. | Required. Must be non-empty. Validate that each entry has a data type and classification level. If null, prompt should flag that NFRs may lack data-specific controls and request classification input. |
[EXISTING_CONTROLS_INVENTORY] | A list of security controls already implemented or planned in the architecture, to avoid generating redundant NFRs. | TLS 1.3 for all service-to-service communication. AWS KMS for encryption at rest. OAuth 2.0 with PKCE for user auth. WAF at CDN edge. | Optional. Accepts null. If provided, validate as a list of control descriptions. Used to deduplicate output and focus on gaps. If empty, prompt should note that all controls will be treated as missing. |
[ACCEPTANCE_CRITERIA_FORMAT] | The required structure for measurable acceptance criteria in each NFR, defining how verification will be performed. | Each criterion must include: metric, target value, measurement method, and frequency. Example: '99.9% of authentication requests complete within 200ms, measured by APM dashboard, verified monthly.' | Required. Must be a non-empty string describing the format. Validate that the description includes metric, target, and method elements. If missing, default to a standard template with threshold, measurement, and cadence. |
[OUTPUT_PRIORITY_SCHEME] | The prioritization framework to apply when ranking extracted NFRs, based on risk, compliance urgency, or implementation dependency. | CRITICAL (blocker for launch), HIGH (required within 30 days), MEDIUM (required within quarter), LOW (continuous improvement). Priority derived from CVSS-like scoring of exploitability and impact. | Required. Must be non-empty. Validate that the scheme defines at least 3 priority levels with clear criteria. If null, default to HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW based on compliance requirement and threat severity. |
Implementation Harness Notes
How to wire the Security NFR extraction prompt into a reliable application workflow with validation, retries, and human review gates.
The Security Non-Functional Requirements Extraction prompt is designed to be embedded in a structured pipeline, not used as a one-off chat interaction. The typical harness accepts a design document, compliance standard reference, or threat model as input, invokes the LLM with the prompt template, validates the structured output, and routes the result to a review queue or downstream requirements management system. Because the output directly influences security architecture decisions, the harness must enforce schema compliance, traceability, and human approval before any extracted NFR is accepted as a committed requirement.
Wire the prompt into an application by first constructing the input context from source documents. If the design document is long, pre-process it with a chunking strategy that preserves section boundaries and sends only the security-relevant sections—authentication flows, authorization models, data protection, network boundaries, and secrets handling. Attach the relevant compliance standard excerpts as [COMPLIANCE_CONTEXT] and any existing threat model findings as [THREAT_MODEL_CONTEXT]. The prompt returns a JSON array of NFR objects, each containing an id, requirement, category, priority, measurable_criteria, and traceable_controls. Validate this output immediately: check that every NFR has a non-empty measurable_criteria field, that priority values are from the allowed enum (Critical, High, Medium, Low), and that traceable_controls maps to at least one control from the provided compliance standard or threat model. Reject and retry any response that fails schema validation, using a repair prompt that includes the validation error details and the original context. After three failed retries, escalate to a human reviewer with the partial output and error log.
Model choice matters here. Use a model with strong reasoning capabilities and a large context window—GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, or Gemini 1.5 Pro are appropriate for production use. Set temperature to 0.1 or lower to maximize consistency across runs. Log every extraction attempt: the input document hash, prompt version, model identifier, raw response, validation result, and final accepted NFR set. This audit trail is essential for governance reviews and for debugging when extracted requirements don't match reviewer expectations. After validation passes, route the NFR list to a human security architect for approval. The approval UI should display each NFR alongside its source evidence—highlight the sentence or paragraph in the design document that motivated the requirement—so the reviewer can confirm traceability without re-reading the entire document. Only after human sign-off should the NFRs be written to the requirements backlog or architecture decision log. Avoid the temptation to auto-commit extracted NFRs without review; a hallucinated security requirement that enters the backlog wastes engineering time and erodes trust in the AI-assisted workflow.
Expected Output Contract
Fields, types, and validation rules for the structured NFR list returned by the Security Non-Functional Requirements Extraction Prompt. Use this contract to parse, validate, and ingest the model response into downstream systems.
| Field or Element | Type or Format | Required | Validation Rule |
|---|---|---|---|
nfr_list | Array of objects | Top-level key must be an array. Reject if missing or not an array. | |
nfr_list[].id | String (e.g., NFR-001) | Must match pattern ^NFR-\d{3}$. Must be unique within the array. | |
nfr_list[].category | Enum string | Must be one of: Authentication, Authorization, Data Protection, Audit, Availability, Network Security, Secrets Management, Resilience, Compliance. | |
nfr_list[].requirement | String | Must be a single, testable security requirement. Reject if empty, purely aspirational, or contains multiple requirements. | |
nfr_list[].source_control | String or null | Must reference a control ID from [COMPLIANCE_STANDARDS] (e.g., NIST-800-53 AC-2) or be null. Reject if non-null value does not match a provided control ID. | |
nfr_list[].acceptance_criteria | Array of strings | Must contain 1-3 measurable criteria. Each string must describe a pass/fail test. Reject if empty or criteria are subjective. | |
nfr_list[].priority | Enum string | Must be one of: Critical, High, Medium, Low. Reject if not in enum. | |
nfr_list[].design_reference | String | Must cite a specific section, diagram, or component from [DESIGN_DOCUMENT]. Reject if reference is vague or not traceable to the input. |
Common Failure Modes
What breaks first when extracting security NFRs from design documents and how to guard against it.
Vague Acceptance Criteria
What to watch: The model produces requirements like 'The system must be secure' or 'Encryption must be strong' without measurable thresholds. This happens when the source document lacks specificity or the prompt doesn't enforce quantification. Guardrail: Require each NFR to include a numeric threshold, a test method, and a measurement window. Add a post-extraction validator that rejects any requirement missing a measurable criterion.
Missing Control Traceability
What to watch: Extracted NFRs float without mapping back to specific controls in the source standard (e.g., NIST 800-53, ISO 27001, SOC 2). This breaks audit evidence chains and makes gap analysis impossible. Guardrail: Require each NFR to cite the source control ID, paragraph, or requirement that spawned it. Add a harness check that flags NFRs with zero control references.
Priority Inflation
What to watch: Every extracted NFR gets marked as 'Critical' or 'High' because the model defaults to urgency when uncertain. This makes real prioritization impossible and causes alert fatigue. Guardrail: Force a distribution constraint in the prompt (e.g., 'No more than 20% of NFRs may be Critical'). Use a post-processing validator that rejects priority distributions outside expected ratios.
Context Window Truncation
What to watch: Long design documents or multi-standard compliance mappings get truncated, causing the model to miss entire security domains (e.g., logging, key management) that appear later in the source. Guardrail: Chunk documents by security domain before extraction. Run a coverage check that verifies each expected domain (authn, authz, encryption, audit, resilience) appears in the output.
Hallucinated Compliance Standards
What to watch: The model invents control references, standard clauses, or regulatory requirements that don't exist in the actual source documents. This is especially dangerous when NFRs feed into compliance evidence. Guardrail: Ground every extracted NFR by requiring a verbatim quote or section reference from the provided source. Add a retrieval-augmented verification step that checks control IDs against a known standards database.
Overlap and Duplication
What to watch: The same security requirement gets extracted multiple times with slightly different wording (e.g., 'Encrypt data at rest' appears under both encryption and data protection sections). This bloats the NFR list and creates maintenance drift. Guardrail: Add a deduplication pass that clusters NFRs by semantic similarity and merges duplicates, preserving the strongest acceptance criteria and all control references.
Evaluation Rubric
Score each dimension on a 1-5 scale. A passing score is 4 or higher on all dimensions. Use this rubric before shipping the Security NFR Extraction Prompt to production.
| Criterion | Pass Standard | Failure Signal | Test Method |
|---|---|---|---|
Requirement Completeness | All security-relevant sections of [DESIGN_DOC] are covered; no major control domain (authn, authz, encryption, logging, network segmentation) is omitted | NFR list misses an entire control domain present in the source document; fewer than 5 distinct security NFRs produced from a document known to contain 10+ | Run prompt against a golden design doc with known security control inventory; count coverage across OWASP ASVS categories |
Measurability of Acceptance Criteria | Every NFR includes a concrete, testable acceptance criterion (e.g., threshold, protocol version, time window, key length) not a vague goal | Acceptance criteria use words like 'secure', 'robust', 'strong', or 'appropriate' without a measurable standard; more than 1 NFR lacks a quantifiable criterion | Parse each NFR's acceptance criteria field; regex-check for numeric thresholds, protocol identifiers, or time durations; flag abstract adjectives |
Traceability to Source Controls | Each NFR cites the specific control, standard section, or threat from [COMPLIANCE_STANDARD] or [THREAT_MODEL] that justifies it | NFRs appear plausible but lack source grounding; traceability field is empty, generic ('best practice'), or hallucinated for more than 1 requirement | Cross-reference each NFR's traceability field against the provided [COMPLIANCE_STANDARD] and [THREAT_MODEL] text spans; verify exact section or control ID exists |
Priority Assignment Consistency | NFRs are assigned priority levels (Critical, High, Medium, Low) that align with the threat severity and compliance impact described in source documents | A known critical control (e.g., missing authentication on admin endpoint) is assigned Medium or Low; priority distribution is flat with no Critical items in a high-risk design | Run against a design doc with pre-labeled threat severities; compute rank correlation between expected severity and assigned priority; flag inversions |
Output Schema Compliance | Output is valid JSON matching the [OUTPUT_SCHEMA] exactly; all required fields present; no extra top-level keys; enum values match allowed sets | JSON parse fails; required field missing in any NFR object; priority field contains a value outside the allowed enum; extra commentary outside the JSON structure | Validate output with a JSON Schema validator configured against [OUTPUT_SCHEMA]; reject on parse error, missing required fields, or enum violations |
No Hallucinated Requirements | Every NFR is directly inferable from the provided [DESIGN_DOC], [COMPLIANCE_STANDARD], or [THREAT_MODEL]; no invented threats or controls | Output includes a security requirement for a technology, protocol, or threat not mentioned in any source document; a plausible-sounding but unsupported NFR appears | Manual review by a security architect comparing each NFR against source documents; automated check: flag any NFR whose traceability field cannot be substring-matched to source text |
Actionability for Engineering Teams | Each NFR is specific enough that an engineering team can implement it without further clarification; includes scope, constraint, and verification method | NFRs are too abstract to implement directly (e.g., 'System must be secure against injection attacks' without specifying input points, encoding strategy, or validation rules) | Have an engineer unfamiliar with the source doc attempt to write a test case from each NFR; flag any NFR where the engineer requests clarification |
Handling of Ambiguous or Missing Inputs | Prompt correctly identifies when [DESIGN_DOC] lacks sufficient detail for a security domain and either omits that domain or marks NFRs with low confidence | Prompt fabricates detailed NFRs for a security domain where the source document provides no information; confidence is marked High on requirements with no source basis | Run against a deliberately sparse design doc missing authn and encryption sections; verify output either omits those domains or includes explicit 'insufficient information' flags with low confidence |
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Adapt This Prompt
How to adapt
Add strict JSON schema validation, retry logic on parse failures, and structured logging of extraction confidence per NFR. Wire the output into a requirements management system. Include a human review step before NFRs are committed to the project backlog.
Prompt modification
Add to [CONSTRAINTS]: Each NFR must include a unique ID, source document reference with section number, and a confidence score (0.0-1.0). If a control from [COMPLIANCE_STANDARD] cannot be traced to any design element, flag it as a gap.
Watch for
- Silent format drift when models change JSON key names
- NFRs that pass schema validation but lack measurable criteria
- Duplicate NFRs extracted from different source sections
- Missing human review gate before NFRs enter sprint planning

About the author
Prasad Kumkar
CEO & MD, Inference Systems
Prasad Kumkar is the CEO & MD of Inference Systems and writes about AI systems architecture, LLM infrastructure, model serving, evaluation, and production deployment. Over 5+ years, he has worked across computer vision models, L5 autonomous vehicle systems, and LLM research, with a focus on taking complex AI ideas into real-world engineering systems.
His work and writing cover AI systems, large language models, AI agents, multimodal systems, autonomous systems, inference optimization, RAG, evaluation, and production AI engineering.
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