Remote Attestation

Binds a unique, unforgeable identity to a specific hardware instance using a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). The attestation key is derived from the silicon itself, making it impossible to clone or move the identity to a different device. This ensures the verifier is communicating with a known, authentic endpoint.

Establishes a tamper-evident log of every software component loaded during boot, from firmware to operating system to application. Each stage measures the next before execution, extending a series of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). This creates a cryptographic hash chain that records the exact software state, allowing detection of any unauthorized modification.

Anchors all security guarantees in immutable hardware logic that cannot be altered by software attacks. This root is the first code executed at power-on and is inherently trusted. It initializes the secure measurement process and protects cryptographic keys from extraction, even by a compromised operating system. Common implementations include Intel SGX, AMD SEV, and Arm TrustZone.

Prevents replay attacks where an attacker records a valid attestation report and replays it later to impersonate a trusted device. The verifier issues a cryptographic nonce (a single-use random number) that must be included in the signed attestation response. This proves the report was freshly generated and the attested environment is currently alive and responsive.

Enables a decryption key to be cryptographically sealed to a specific trusted state. The key is only released by the hardware if the current PCR values match a predefined policy. If the system has been tampered with or booted into an unapproved configuration, the hardware refuses to unseal the key, rendering encrypted models or data permanently inaccessible to the compromised environment.

Produces a digitally signed attestation report that can be validated by a remote party without trusting any intermediate network infrastructure. The signature is rooted in a public key infrastructure (PKI) linked to the hardware manufacturer. This allows a cloud tenant to verify the integrity of a server they do not physically control, enabling confidential computing across untrusted infrastructure.

A hardware-enforced secure area within a main processor that guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of code and data loaded inside it. TEEs are the fundamental hardware root of trust that makes remote attestation possible.

• Isolates model inference from the host operating system
• Generates cryptographic attestation reports signed by the hardware
• Examples: Intel SGX, AMD SEV-SNP, ARM TrustZone

A cryptographic protocol that distributes a model's computation across multiple parties who jointly compute an inference result without revealing their private input shares to one another.

• Complements attestation by removing single-point trust
• Each party can attest to their isolated execution environment
• Used when no single TEE is trusted by all stakeholders

A cryptographic method allowing computation directly on encrypted data. When combined with remote attestation, a client verifies the enclave's integrity before releasing a decryption key.

• Model never sees plaintext user input
• Attestation proves the encrypted computation path is unmodified
• Eliminates trust in the cloud provider's memory protections

The process of cryptographically securing a stored model artifact so it can only be loaded and executed by an authorized runtime possessing the correct decryption key.

• Attestation verifies the runtime's identity and integrity before key release
• Prevents offline extraction of model weights from disk
• Often paired with Secure Enclaves for key management

A class of defenses that eliminate or mask physical information leakage—such as timing, power consumption, or electromagnetic emanations—from a processor running model inference.

• Attestation can verify that mitigations are active
• Protects against attackers with physical access to hardware
• Critical for edge deployments where TEEs face proximity threats

An active defense mechanism that immediately and irrevocably erases cryptographic keys, model weights, and sensitive data from memory upon detection of a physical tampering event.

• Triggered when attestation checks fail
• Ensures data is destroyed before an attacker can extract it
• Implements the fail-secure principle in embedded systems